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← Klaaryo

Klaaryo — agentic threat model

8.6AIVSS 8.6 · High

Klaaryo presents a moderate-to-high risk profile due to its direct integration with WhatsApp and handling of sensitive candidate PII, making it a prime target for prompt injection via resumes and automated phishing distribution.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 7.3AARS uplift 1.3Factor sum 4.6/10Threat ×1.05Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.70
Goal-Driven Planning
0.60
Self-Modification
0.10
Dynamic Tool Use
0.50
Persistent Memory
0.70
Contextual Awareness
0.60
Dynamic Identity
0.20
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.10
Non-Determinism
0.60
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.50

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely utilizes third-party LLMs for conversational screening. Vulnerable to prompt injection embedded in candidate resumes or WhatsApp messages, which could bypass screening criteria or leak system instructions.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — processes candidate resumes, contact details, and chat histories. Vulnerable to PII exfiltration and database poisoning if malicious candidate profiles are ingested into the RAG or vector storage systems.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — orchestrates candidate engagement and ATS updates. Vulnerable to tool misuse where prompt injection triggers unauthorized WhatsApp messages or corrupts candidate status records.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — hosted as a closed-source SaaS platform. Vulnerable to WhatsApp API token theft, insecure webhook endpoints, and potential remote code execution if resume parsing libraries are unpatched.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — no mention of evaluation frameworks or guardrails. Vulnerable to undetected bias in automated screening decisions and a lack of audit trails for conversational anomalies.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — handles recruitment data which is highly regulated under GDPR/CCPA. Lacks visible compliance certifications, data retention policies, or explicit consent mechanisms for automated AI decision-making.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — primarily acts as a standalone integration. Risks are limited to cascading failures or data synchronization issues with connected Applicant Tracking Systems (ATS) and the WhatsApp Business API.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.