Keringit — agentic threat model
Keringit presents a high-risk profile due to its ability to generate, customize, and instantly deploy Web3 applications and smart contracts from plain text or cloned GitHub repositories. The lack of explicit sandboxing or security guardrails for generated code increases the risk of deploying vulnerable or malicious decentralized applications.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.60 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.50 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.70 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.30 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.60 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.50 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.20 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.70 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.60 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The underlying LLMs are not specified. However, the model is susceptible to prompt injection via user prompts or malicious code comments in cloned GitHub repositories, potentially leading to the generation of backdoored smart contracts.
Not certain from the listing — Data ingestion methods are not detailed, but the ability to clone arbitrary GitHub repositories introduces a significant data provenance risk, where malicious code or prompt-injection payloads can be ingested into the agent's context.
The agent framework orchestrates code generation, repository cloning, and deployment. Vulnerabilities here include insecure tool integration (e.g., executing arbitrary Git commands or deployment scripts) and tool misuse during the 'one-click' deployment phase.
The 'launch instantly' feature implies hosting and deployment infrastructure. If the environment compiling and deploying the generated Web3 apps is not strictly sandboxed, it faces threats of container escape, privilege escalation, and exposure of deployment/Web3 private keys.
Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of automated vulnerability scanning, smart contract auditing, or guardrails to detect malicious or insecure code before it is deployed to blockchain networks.
The real-time collaboration feature implies multi-user access, which introduces risks of broken object-level authorization (BOLA) or unauthorized code modifications. No compliance certifications or security audits are mentioned.
Not certain from the listing — While the agent supports collaboration, there is no explicit mention of a multi-agent ecosystem or marketplace interactions, limiting immediate A2A trust abuse risks.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.