Keploy — agentic threat model
Keploy presents a high agentic risk profile due to its deep system-level access via eBPF and integration into CI/CD pipelines, where LLM-driven self-healing and test generation could be exploited to execute arbitrary code or exfiltrate sensitive live network traffic.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.70 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.60 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.40 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.80 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.20 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.80 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.20 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.10 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.50 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.50 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Uses multi-model LLMs for test generation and self-healing. Threats include prompt injection leading to the generation of malicious test code or stubs, and model misalignment causing silent test inaccuracies.
Records live application traffic to generate mocks and test cases. This introduces severe risks of data exfiltration or exposure of sensitive production data (PII, credentials, API keys) captured in transit, as well as traffic poisoning.
Orchestrates test generation and self-healing. Insecure tool integration is a major threat, as the agent translates LLM outputs directly into executable test scripts and mocks within the development environment.
Utilizes eBPF instrumentation, which typically requires root or highly privileged capabilities (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) on the host. Compromise at this layer allows full host takeover, container escape, and lateral movement in CI/CD environments.
Not certain from the listing — it is unclear what guardrails or evaluation frameworks are in place to validate the safety, correctness, and benign nature of the LLM-generated self-healing code before execution.
Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of built-in compliance controls, access management, or automated sanitization/masking of sensitive data captured from live eBPF network traffic.
Not certain from the listing — while it operates within a broader DevOps ecosystem, there is no explicit indication of multi-agent collaboration or marketplace integrations that could lead to cascading trust failures.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.