Jobbyo — agentic threat model
Jobbyo is a high-risk agentic tool due to its handling of sensitive PII (resumes, career history) and its capability to perform automated web actions (auto-applying to jobs), which exposes users to data exfiltration and prompt injection via untrusted job descriptions.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.80 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.60 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.20 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.70 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.80 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.70 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.50 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.10 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.60 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.50 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The underlying foundation model is unspecified. However, processing untrusted external job descriptions during scraping introduces a high risk of indirect prompt injection, potentially manipulating the agent's resume tailoring or application behavior.
The agent manages highly sensitive PII, including resumes, work history, and career preferences. It also ingests external data via web scraping. This creates a dual risk of data exfiltration of user profiles and data poisoning from malicious job postings designed to corrupt the agent's persistent memory.
The orchestration framework manages browser automation/web scraping and form-filling tools to execute 'Auto-Apply'. Insecure tool integration could allow malicious job application portals to exploit the form-filler, leading to client-side script execution or unauthorized data submission.
Not certain from the listing — The deployment infrastructure for running browser automation and storing user session state is undisclosed. If the browser execution environment is not strictly sandboxed, it could be vulnerable to container escape or session hijacking.
Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of logging, guardrails, or evaluation mechanisms to detect if the agent is applying to scam jobs, submitting corrupted resumes, or leaking PII to unauthorized endpoints.
Handling extensive user PII and automating job applications subjects the agent to strict compliance requirements (GDPR/CCPA). The lack of explicit security certifications or data retention policies in the listing represents a significant compliance gap.
The agent interacts directly with external ecosystems (job boards, Applicant Tracking Systems). While not a multi-agent system, this boundary crossing exposes the agent to untrusted third-party inputs and potential rate-limiting or IP blocking by target platforms.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.