gstack — agentic threat model
gstack introduces structured workflow discipline to coding agents, but its deep integration with code repositories and release pipelines presents a high-impact supply chain risk if workflow gates are bypassed.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.60 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.80 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.20 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.80 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.40 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.70 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.30 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.70 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.50 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.50 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — gstack relies on external models like Claude Code and Codex. Threats include prompt injection bypassing workflow gates, or model poisoning affecting code generation quality.
Not certain from the listing — Primarily operates on local codebases and repositories rather than dedicated vector databases. Threats include codebase poisoning where malicious code in the repo manipulates the agent's context.
gstack orchestrates Claude Code and Codex via structured workflows, review gates, and specialist commands. Vulnerabilities in the workflow engine could allow malicious code to bypass review gates or execute unauthorized commands during QA/release.
Not certain from the listing — As an open-source tool, deployment is local or self-hosted. Risks include execution in un-sandboxed developer environments, potentially allowing generated code to compromise the host system or access sensitive environment variables.
Provides structured review gates and release checks to monitor agent outputs. However, if these gates lack independent, automated sandboxed execution, malicious or buggy code could still slip through to release.
Not certain from the listing — The framework provides 'release control' and 'shipping discipline' but does not detail built-in RBAC, audit logging, or compliance mapping for enterprise environments.
Designed to coordinate multiple role-based workflows and coding agents. A compromise in one agent or a malicious dependency could propagate across the workflow, leading to cascading failures or supply chain contamination.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.