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Graphlit — agentic threat model

9.2AIVSS 9.2 · Critical

Graphlit presents a high data-centric risk profile as a serverless RAG-as-a-Service platform, where the primary threats involve data poisoning, embedding inversion, and unauthorized access to ingested unstructured enterprise data.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 8.5AARS uplift 0.66Factor sum 4.4/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.40
Goal-Driven Planning
0.20
Self-Modification
0.10
Dynamic Tool Use
0.50
Persistent Memory
0.80
Contextual Awareness
0.80
Dynamic Identity
0.20
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.30
Non-Determinism
0.60
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.50

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — Graphlit integrates with external LLMs, making it susceptible to adversarial prompt injection, model misalignment, or data leakage if the underlying foundation models are compromised or manipulated.

L2 · Data Operations✓ mapped

As a RAG-as-a-Service platform handling automated ETL, multimodal ingestion, and vector embeddings, the primary threats are data poisoning of the vector store, embedding inversion, and unauthorized exfiltration of sensitive unstructured data.

L3 · Agent Frameworks✓ mapped

Graphlit provides conversation history management and LLM integration tools. Vulnerabilities here include memory poisoning within the conversation history and insecure orchestration of the RAG pipeline.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — Being a serverless platform, infrastructure security depends on the cloud provider's isolation, but threats include container escape, API key exposure, and insecure serverless function execution.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The description does not mention built-in guardrails or evaluation metrics, leaving potential blind spots in detecting drift, toxic outputs, or RAG retrieval anomalies.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — No specific compliance certifications (e.g., SOC2, ISO) or fine-grained access control mechanisms are detailed, posing risks to regulatory alignment when handling sensitive enterprise data.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — While designed to build AI-powered applications and agents, the platform's role in multi-agent orchestration or marketplace interactions is not specified, though cascading failures from compromised upstream data sources remain a risk.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.